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I

"The settlers' town is a strongly-built town, all made of
stone and steel. It is a bri3htly-lit town; the streets are covered
with asphalt, and the garbage-cans swallow all the leavings, unseen,
unknown and hardly thought about. Tl-1e settler I s feet are never visible,
except perhaps in the' sea; but there you're never close enough to see
them. His feet are protected by strong shoes althougl1 the streets of
his town are clean and even, with no holes or stones. The settler's
town is a well-fed town, an easy-going town~ its belly is ahJays full
of good things. The settler's town is a town of vhite people, of
foreigners.
The town belonging to the colonized people, or at least the
native town, the Hegro village, the mec1_ina, the reservation, is a
place of ill fame peopled by rnen of evil repute. They are born there,
it matters little?- uhere or how; they <lie there, it matters not where
nor how. It is a world without spaciousness: men live there on top of
each other, and their huts are built or,e on top of the other. The native
tmm is a hungry town, starved of bread, of meat, of r3hces, of coal, of
light. The native town is a crouchin<,; village, a town on its knees, a
town wallowing in the mire. It is a tm,m of nir;gen, and dirty arabE:.
The town that the native turns on the settler 1 s town is a look of lust,
a look of envy ... " ( Fan on)
The year 2000 is only 33 years mn1y.

That is the year we hone to retire,

and it can serve as a useful horizon for vieuinr, the terrible problems of the
underdeveloped world and the possible role for Canada.
The prospects for the world in our time are not good.
of a bleak picture that Canmlians must choose and act.

It is in the context

It is likely that at the

outset of the 21st century the number of people livinp, in poverty will be as much
as double the current number.
willing to do.

He have few i_llusions about what Canada will he

He suggest policies that are possible even j_f not probable.

Even

a small power, if it understands the situation, can do something to help, and in
some cases, this can even be done with little cost and great benefit to itself.
There is a conflict of interest between the first and third ,rnrld. Canada
has a choice between being a middle power in the first world or making a heroic
effort to transcend this conflict.
options for underdeveloped countries.

It can do this by providing wider

Canada cannot by itself solve the problems

of the underdeveloped world, but it can contribute to an environment in which

the underdeveloped countries hav<2 a chance to help themselves.
The underdeveloped countries do not have much scope for ir.dependent action.
Their resources are too limited.

Still, they <lo not do as uell as they might.

They inherit from their past, and from their colonial experience, institutions
unsuited to their present problems.
In Canada, it is will rather than ability which is lacking.

We are on the

threshold of a new era where our own basic problems of food, clothing and shelter
can be solved, by old standards,, at least.
tunity for new initiatives.

The material base provides the oppor

There is the possibility for experiment.

Surprisingly, there is a new significance in small uni_ts.

It is, for example,

at the level of the city that we now face the important questions of how we live,
walk, eat, work, learn, sleep and pray.

And recent Canadian experience shows that

the most vigorous quest for a life style occurs at the provincial, not the national
level.
At the international level, independence for Canada is only meaningful in
relation to the great issues the world now faces.

For our lifetime the problems

of the underdeveloped countries will intensify, and though we try to ignore them,
we can do so only by sacrificing part of ourselves.
no onlookers.

We all have dirty hands."

(Fanon)

"There are no innocents and
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II

The facts about Horld poverty· are well known. 1

They are publicize d and

repeated from the most respectab le sources-- but like t11e death statistic s of
great disasters , they are beyonc1 comprehen sion.

Neverthe less, it is worth re

peating them, because they are to be ,vi th us for the foreseeab le future, perhaps
,-li th increasin1 :; horror.

Such a recitat:..o n of the crude facts must include the informati on that:
1.

1~t Cl,rrent growth rates, the 3ap behreen the poor ond the Healthy

nations increases steadily; in the rich countries rapid and steady tech
nolosical ch::mc;e provides the main impetus for c;rowth while the underdeve loped
countries have the c;reo.test difficult y in absorbing the teclmoloc y that
already exists.

11

In the rich comitries averCLr;e income per head is going up

· about $50 a 3rear; in the poor countries by about $2. 50 a year and in the very
poor countries by about $l. 50 )er ;y20.r. " 2

The gap for the poor between what

they do nncl the potential provided by modern technology " g--rows each year.
2.

Within the poor world, the r!1ore prosperou s nuclei are not c;rmrin,3 fast

enough to lower the absolute nwnber livine; in rural poverty.

Grm-rine; pools

of unemploym ent are the result.

3.

Populatio n growth bas become such that it is becoming :raore difficult

to meet even minimal requireme nts of bare existence .
~-.

Even if grmrth rates of 6 per cent per annwn were achieved-- 1-rell in

excess of past average performan ce and even greater than the objective s
of the U.N. developme nt deco.de--b y the end of this century the per capita
income of the poor countries would still be dismally low--perh aps only

$100 per capita in India and in some 1~frican countries , for example.
Economics is again the dismal science.
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II

The facts about world :9overty are ·well known. 1

They are publicized and

repeated from the most respectable sources--but like the death statistics of
great disasters, they are beyond comprehension.

Nevertheless; it is worth re

peating them, because they are to be with us for the foreseeable future, perhaps
with increasine; horror.
Such a recitation of the crude facts must include the information that:
1.

At current growth rates, the Gap between the poor and the uealthy

nations increases steadily; in the rich countries rapid and steady tech
noloe;ical chanQ;e {Jrovides the main impetus for c;rowth while the underdeveloped
countries have the c;reatest difficulty in absorbinc; the tech.noloe;y that
already exists,

''In the rich countries averae;e income per head is going up

· about $50 a year; in the poor countries by about $2.50
poor countries by about $1.50 :9er yearo 112

The gap

for

Cl

year and in the very

the poor between what

they do nnd the potential provided by modern technology" g,.rows each year"
2.

Within the poor world, the more prosperous nuclei are not c;rm-ling fast

enough to lower the absolute nwnber living in rural poverty.

Grouing pools

of unemployr:ient are the result.

3.

Population growth has become such that it is becoming more difficult

to meet even minimal requirements of bare existence.

4.

Even if grm-1th r3.tes of

6 per cent per annum uere achieved--well in

excess of past average performance and even greater than the objectives
of the UoN, development decade--by the end of this century the per capita
income of the poor countries would still be dismally lou--perhaps only

$100 per capita in India and in some i1frican countries, for example.
Economics is again the dismal science"
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III

Typically, these facts are introduced o.s a prelude to charitable instincts;
we parade the poor and pass the plate.
be expected.

That little comes of this is perhaps to

On the domestic scene very few of our deep-seated social or economic

problems have been solved by an appeal to predominantly charitable instincts.

The

amounts generated are inevitably small and their allocation is more closely
tailored to the tastes of the donor than the needs of the reci1,ient. 3
In the development of the first world, primary reliance has been placed on
the private initiative of businessmen to mobilize resources for ca};)ital foruation
and technological change.

The government has acted to help business ancl. to o.me-

liorate some of the more serious dislocations resultinc; from industrialization,
but by and large has not played an initiating role except for overheuc1 capito.l.
There is little reason to expect the government to do ubroacl 1·1hat it c~oeo not C::.o
at home.

It is more in line with our history that governments loot at their aid

programs as handmaidens to the private business sector (their own or those abroad)
rather than as the main vehicle of growth.

Even if the goverruilent -wished to o.o

otherwise it has little scope because it is not government but our private corporations that possess the capital, tecl1noloc;y and enterprise that are so badly
needed abroad.

If such institutions can be little influenced even at home, it

is hardly surprisinc; that they cannot be mobilized for public purposes abroad.
The total volmne of Horld aid, after a period of rapid c;rowth, has stao;nated
in recent years. 4

Since some of what we call aid is not an outric;ht gift but

merely a long term loan at interest rates which are low only in cornpariGon ,·rith
recent market rates, the net :free foreign exchange made available to countries
on public accmmt is declining, the flow of interest costs and debt repayment out
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of the underdeveloped countries offsets a substantial proportion of the gross
1; nwi1ber of developing countries ho.ve therefore found the111selves in severe

aid.

balance of payments tlifficulties. to ,·Thi ch heavy fixed obligations to service

5
overseas holdings of public debt have ri1ade o. significant cont::cibution.
Even more serious are privo.te account flows:

the reverse flou of earnings

and of capital transfer have more than out-1-reic;hed new foreic;n invest:ment.

The

foreic;n investruent which does occur is concentro.tecl in industries satisfyinc;
the needs of the developed i:wrld, such as the pctrolewa industry, rather than
being directed tm-rards engenc.ering endoc;enous c;;rowth processes
developed countries.

The lo.cl: of donor enthusiasm to

2_:,:..

0

ovi:le

'\'Ii thin
2.

the tmder

lonc;-ten1 finance

on soft terDs has been co;,1binecJ. uith an ove::n·1illins;ness to provide s~1ort-term
loans.

Businessr!len 1·1ishing to sell to the underdevelucled iror.7.d receive c;reat

encourae;ement from the c;overnment through export cred:it 0 ue.rantee arranc;ements
for commercio.l credits and contractor fin~mce.

Ofter::. these are for 2.Jrecisely

the projects which uould be rejected in the context of an aid proe;ramE1e.

The

harrassed bureaucracies of underdeveloped countries accept this foru of help.
'l'hi::: short-term commercial credit on hard teri;1s creates fixed obligations, some
times of alarming proportion.

Overseas finance in these circumstances creates

a resource transfer in the short-term but fairly soon the debt must be repayed,
often before the investment yields a return.

The underdeveloped countries then

must appeal for refinancing and, through virtual international bankruptcy, lose
control over their policies to the lending nations, typically through the medilrrn
of international agencies.
The Economist's report on the treatment of Ghana provides a case in point
(August 6, 1966).

The Economist estiE1ated tho.t Ghana's Imblic debt uas over

one billion dollars and over tuo-thirds of this total uas in debt of average
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maturity of six years or less.

Their toncue-in-cheel: description of the pre

liminary creditor's meeting of June) 1966, runs:
"Ghana explained its plic;ht to the representatives
of 13 1·1estern countries, the r;eneral reaction uas somewhat
reserved. The ~·:wiss said, predictably~ that debts were debts
and they hoped Swiss debts would be paid promptly. The Ger
man delegate brought up the question of German property con
fiscated in Ghana during the Har. The Israeli delegate said
he hoped Israel would be considered to qualify as one of the
underdeveloped countries entitled to uninterrupted repayment.
The British delegate said he hoped any stretch-out of repay
ments would be a "reasonably short one".
The ineffectiveness of aid not only derives from the inadequacy of the
net flows and the danc;ers of excessive international indebtedness, but also
results from the character of the aid given.
Politics and development are necessarily interrelated.

But the political

content of aid prograrmnes is unfortunate, for the distribution of aid is rnore
influenced by the strategic and ideoloc;ical pre-conceptions of the major donors
than by any assessment of the c;enuine development implications of the political
institutions of the recipients.
these differences are critical.

6

Since there is no lmderlyinc; harmony of interest,
Only too often strategic considerations are

interpreted in a short-term context, stressing foreign rather than domestic
policies of the recipients.
This is perhaps not surprising.

Aid, after all, could only have reached

the level it has if somethinr; more than the charitable instincts had been aroused.
It would matter less if the amount involved were very large.

"Client"

states of the United Etates in the Far I;ast have achieved very favourable rates
of c;rowth--Formosa and South Korea, for example.

If the ·wealthy countries are

willing to take a sizeable enouQ;h interest in a country it may well develop
irrespective of the other circw.nstances.

Houever, no such larce flow is likel~, and effectivene ss of the meagre flow
is reduced by non-econorai c choices, sometimes to the ~)oint of counter-eff ective
ness by bolsterin,3 rec;ir.ies alien to c'.;eveloprnent.

IV

Not surprisingl y, aid has not 1JOrked miracles.

Throughout the third world

political tensions and conflicts continue and are:; if anything, aggro.vated by
growth.
Tragically, hmrever, the frustration s and tensions are not fim1ing their
outlet in creative social transformat ion, but in civil and regional strife with
destructive consequence s.

ProGrarnmes of national independenc e, initially focused

against colonial powers, becorae banners for strui:;gles beh-reen groups in the under
developed world.

These tensions and conflicts are inevitable.

The appeal to

increase aid to avoid revolution is both danc;erous, because it avoids the reality
of the poor world, and dishonest, in that it cannot succeed in any such purpose,
at the aid levels which are enviso.e;ec',.

If the prevention of revolution is seen

as one of the purposes of aid, it is only too easy to turn to other tools when aid
fails to achieve the desired counter-rev olutionary purpose.
Seen at the deepest level; the cJ.ilem::m of aid, both in the form of capital
and technical assistance~ is that it bolsters the metropolita n influence in the
ex-colonial world, when the most profound problems in the recipient countries
involve the need to breal: fron certain social, economic and cultural metropolita n
influences, no matter ho-w altruistic the motivo.tion of the mother country.

Develop

r,1ent is made at home.
The answer that is sometimes offered. is multilatera lisrn--a popular view in

Canada.

But international ac;encies tal:e on the ideoloc;ico.l overtones anc1 cultural

assurnptions of their major sponsors o

This is certainly true of the Horld Bank,

for example, with its J\merican-1\nc;lo anioience o

Even when international ac;encies

develop views and interests 1;,1hich are not too tied to the foreign policy objectives of a major cmmtry; multilateralism is only satisfactory as an addition
to the constellation, rather than as a consolidation and replaceL1ent for other
aid sourceso

In the end, individual underdeveloped countries are better off when

faced with a nuL1ber of parties on the other side of the table in international
financial nec;otiations.

1

\!hen thieves fall out,

It

It is very i1aportant for poor countries to have a range of choice, so that
the consequences of breaking with one source of support is not necessarily
disastrouso
Effectiveness of aid is also reduced by policies which use aid programmes
as a tool of trade policy o7

'rl1e n01,r prevalent practice of tying bilatero.l

o.id to imported goods frora the donor (even the UoSo is now forced in this direc
tion by her chronic balance of payments problem), warps the design of plans and
projects, reduces the real value of the aid flol'l, and has undesirable effects on
the evolution of trade patterns by inhibiting trade within the poor worldo
In criticizine; aid policy there is no intention to imply maliciousness
amongst aid agencies anymore than it characterized the colonial civil serviceo

'

They are staffed by the most humane of public servants.

However, the exic;encies

of the balance of payments crises in the United Kingdom, for example_ ho.ve been
such that it is haindly surprising that there should have been an attemrit to mini-

8
mize the foreign exchange costs of the aid prograrnrae o

Foreign aid supporters

are forced to demonstrate to those public servants responsible for the balance
of payments situation,or for trade promotion) the consistency of the aid effort

·\Iith other public objectives.

Only in that ,,a::/ c::o ::;:irogr3.1.Jr.1es survive

o

A necessary

result, in a 1wrld with chronic shortaGe of forei;::sn e~:cho.nc;e reserves, has been
increased

tying of aid to the exports of the donor countries; rather than allow

ing bilateral transfers to generate multilateral tro.de flous.
A look at the performance of major donors illustrates some of the problems

of aid.

Both Britain and France reEiain heavily corim1itted to their traditional

imperial interests. 9

This is especially true in I\frica, ,-rhere p:cogrann:1es of

financial aid are combined with the maintenance of elaborate 1Jroc;rmm-,1es of
technical assistance, with the objective of making the transfer of administra
tions to full local control as painless, and perl10..ps as sloH, as possible.
In some countries, government is still dependent on the mother cotmtry for
recurrent costs.

The virtue in these prograrnraes has been to maintain high levels

of civil administration Hhere there i'Tould other,·1ise have been the danger of sHift
deterioration.

The cost has been the failure to initiate o.ny c;reat experiments

in administrative practice with the achievernent of formal independence.

The

result has been, only too often, t11e creation of elites who occupy the offices
without any noticeable improvement in responsiveness to the country's problem.
Too great an exercise of independence on the part of the new African powers
diminishes the flow of aid--this happened abruptly at a very early stage in the
relationship between Guinea and France, fo:c example, and has resulted from the
recent break between Tanzania and Britain.

Ar,ain, frorn the point of view of the

donor) the action may not be malicious; it was not surprisinc;, after all, that
suspension of a "f,7 million aid offer should flow from Tanzania's decision to
break diplomatic relations with Britain's Labour Government, over the weak
British policy towards the Rhodesian rebellion.
Generally, however, both Britain and France have managed to maintain a
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consider-able dec;:ree o:.'.' influence in IJrcvious colonies.

In r;1any parts of _frico.)

the most serious competitor for influer._ce is the U.S.
The United States position is different.
"The United States beco.me involved in international
development aid on a Liajor scale principally as a byproduct of
the world uicle responsibilities thrown upon it as a leader of the
Tile stern Wo:tld after World Har II. The size as ,rell as the direction
of U.S. aid is an erbraordinary blend of humanitarian sentiment and
cold war strategy. 11
While Britain and France have been moving from a situation of outright
control) back to prepared positions of pervasive but less obtrusive influence,
the U.S. has been en[!:aged in the reverse process.

The U.S. has asserted dominant

and overt influence in many areas over the past decade,,

Her involvement is

carried tot.he necessary breadth of activity and strength of commitment.

When the United States decides to make a major commitment, the penetration
can be pervasive and the effect overv1heli:1inc;---capital oid, food supplies:. economic, political and military advisors, educational support.

Such involvement

can lead to economic c;rowth, but it cannot be a satisfactory technique throughout
i:;he underdeveloped 1;1orld.

In the context of severe social tensions; the tendency

is for the United States to identify lJith conservatives and as they come w1der
attack, the pos.sibility of American military involvement arises.

The sequence

is not unlike that which in the past has led to the establishment o:f great empires.
But for se 1eral reasons; the United States is condemned to create an eL1pire
based almost exclusively on an extreme system of indirect rule.

This could be

most effective in conditions in which there are appropr:cate indigenous croups
who can form effective ac;encies of U.S. policy.

However, too often the only

material avaj_lable :is of sorry qu3i_i ty, and wi3~1.t be e;:pcctecl to perform very
inadequately as promoters of development.

Perlw.ps, c;iven the inevitability of
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,;rn.erican influence; it i:wuld be healthj_er if it 1)e1':I'ori:1ed more directly.

There

can be little doubt tho.t if ;\derican control were directly implemented, and
:m1erican technology and ideology brought directly to 11ork on the development
problems in those rec;ions of current American interest, the effects uould be
economico.lly more satisfactory than those of the dubious governments they find
themselves bolstering.
One view of the clilernmas America faces uas set out by I,lillilmn and Rostow
in an article in Foreign Affairs in April 1958.

Je quote at length because their

1

article has proved to be a c;ood prediction of subsequent policy.
become the 1,io.jor Presidential advisor on these problems.

Rostow has since

They comment that

"the buildinc; of modern economies and centralized modern c~overn
ments has been driven alone:; less by the profit motive than by the
aspirations for increased national and hu:c1an dignity."
The American interest in the third world is fundamentally political, as they
see it.

Countries j_n the third world. are in a transitional phase in uhich

nationalism may turn in varyine:; proportions to three objectives:

one, the

consolidation of the pm-Jer of the neu state over old 1°ecional interests; tvo.
external adventure; three, economic and social L1odernization.

At the time of

writing the article, they thought that these strateGies were typified by Diem,
Nasser, and Nehru respectively.
The third objective is critical because it determines the lenr;th of the
transition to modernity.
"Cornmunist policy," they note, "is based squarely on an understanding
of this precarious transitional process ... Soviet diplomacy and propaganda
have systematically souc;ht to divert their attention from the tasks of
modernization towards 'bloody shirt' policies; that is, an obsessive
concern to redress real or believed past humiliations--c olonialisrn, Israel,
Kashmir, West Irian, etc.
We are confronted with a systematic effort--diplom atic, psychological,
economic and political--to exploit the weaknesses, confusions, and tempta
tions of ne,,r nations in the transitional period so as to clamp communism
down finally on them before steady economic c;rowth and the political
resilience of a modern state emerge."

Faced with this challenc;e they see
" ... the essential objective of American policy in the tranoitional
areas is to use whatever influence we can brine to bear to focus the
le cal enerc;~_es, talents, and resources on the constructive tasks of
rnodernization. 11
They identif;y three propositions
"first, that private enterprise in superior in efficiency to public
enterprise, even in the underdeveloped areas; second, that substantial
unta.ppecl potentialities exist in pL1blic policy both for expandinc;
American r;rivate CD.Ilital ezy,orts and for increased collaboration
between publ::.c aml private sources of capital; ancl third, that the
AL1erican c;overnrnent could do rnore than it is nm·T doinc; to create a
more favourable climate for private investment in the underdeveloped
areas.:,
They see, houeve:c, that too s1Iift returns on their proposed proc;ram must
not be expected.

What ir. needed

•
l

n
C

11

• • • a sense of history and patience ... to see us through into the stac;e
when most Lien and c;overnrnents in the ,mrld come to preceive that
private cap:~ talis1i1, domestic anc.-:. foreic;n, has an eA-panding role to play
in the neu nations capable of reinforcinc; their larger political and
social objectives. 11

At the conclusion) the Hriters comment:
"In addition, there remains the challen_sing and extremely important
tasl~ of findinc.; a method and an instrwnent for co-'.Jrdinatinc; tl1e economic
developme:1t proc;rar;1s, 1101,1 mainly bilateral, Hi thin the f:ree worlcJ_. 11
I\. major question for Canada is to exm:1ine the dee:;ree to which it ac;rees

Hi th this perception of the problem and the remedies proposed.

The major fault of this position is that it Q;rossly oversimplifies the
p:i:oblem of the unclen1evelopcd countrieG and leads to a forrn of involve1;1ent -which
is good for neither the first nor the third uorld.

It involves the underdeveloped

Norld in the inter;:i.al ~,robleras of' the U. 8. o.nd in the conflict betueen the first
and second uorld,s.

S'airly quietly the c;oal of openinc; up these countries to

private capital and of protcctinc; them from their

II

,1co.J~nesses
1 confusions) and

temptations:t becowes the encl "en itselfc
Underdeveloped countries uust solve their proble1:1s in the context of their

mm history o

Insteo.d of forcinc; upon thei;1 the myth,s o.nrl convent ional uisdoras of

other cotmtrie s" stresc should be p1aced on :.::;ivinc; them more room to m.J.neuve
ro
Ira-ported dcvelopn ent strategi es did not Horl: unde1' paleo-•c olonialis m_ and
there is
not :r:mch reason to expect them to work .under neo-colo nialism.
For the

11

Third Horld" one possibi lity was to rnanipul ate Cold War competit iono

The existenr: :e of a Soviet Bloc 1:1ight be thought to provide aid and trade possi-
b_'_litie s, and to allow the poor countrie s more maneuv erability in their efforts
to maintain their freecloL1 from the Free 1;for1cL

That this could be so in practice

uas indicate d by the perforna nce of the UoA .R. over the yeo.:;:.•s o

'rhe rei:mrta ble

rmccesse s of the Ifasse:c rec:;irilc r;1ay be in rmrt due to the fact that their 1,1ost
severe confront o.tion 1·1ith the Free World came in their conflic t -ui th B:citain
and
Frs.nce rather than the UoS.
exac;ger ated o

Tile :9ossibi lities of this alternat ive must not be

The Soviet Union has shoi:m no enthusia sm for any great expansio n

of its role in the less develope d ,·rorld.
increasi ng caution o

If anythinc ;: it has tended t01mrds

Soviet aid has been limitec.1 and has been as r,mch attached

to the particu lar e:::port potenti alities of the Soviet economy as has the bilo.ter
al
aid uhich emanates from the Hest, and in many cases, a good deal less sldllful
ly
appliedo

Further, the increasi ng detente between the Soviet anc1 the UoS. in the

Cold War muGt narrow the possibi lities of the less develope d ,10rld in this
respecto
China has, surprisi ncly enouGh, at times provided c;enerou s and Gensible
financeo

Surprisi ngly, as her own economi c situatio n is no better than that of the

countrie s she has aided

O

Houever , the possible mo.te:da l contribu tion of China

r.1ust obviousl ~r be extreme ly limited b:, the ure;ency of her own needs o

The role

of Chino. is more lil::ely to serve as an example of the possibi lity of developm
ent
without depencle nce--not in the sense of Mnoist revoluti on, but rather in a
more
general sense of the possibi lity of independ ent action, if backed by sufficie
nt

will and unity over a large enou7b area.
Thus, in a broad outline, the r,lobal coPtcxt in which Canada must consider
its relationship with the uaderdeveloped world is one in which:
(i)
(ii)

colonial dependency has ended but independence has not been achieved;
the new forms of control may be less effective in engendering develop-

rnent than the benevolent paternalism of some parts of the old colonialism;
(iii)

freedom of maneuver in the less developed world depends partly on the

diversity of alternatives in the rich world.

V

A Productive Role for Canada
It is well for small countries not to exaggerate their own importance.
They should also recognize that the grand design of world affairs is not ex
clusively the product of the great powers.
Canada cannot transform the world because of her small size and because
the pursuit of policies contradictory to those of the U.S. will involve costs
of retaliation and loss of good~·Ji.11.
Further, there is nothing in the character of Canadian society which would
suggest that if it became a major particip.ant in the communication with the poor
countries, it would not eventually develop similar policies and attitudes as the
other great powers.

It has not, in the West Indies, performed notably differently

from other powers.
However, some potentialities exist.

Canada, with a gross national product

of $57 billion, commands a greater annual flow of output than the whole of black
Africa, or of India.

Canada, a midget compared with the North American colossus,

still has economic capabilities comparable to major regions of considerable
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2ignificance.

If Canada ever allocated l',~ of her national product to the aid

proc;ranme as promised in the recent speech from the Throne (instead of one
quarter of one per cent in past years), he17 .corifribution would be of similar
order to that currently made by Britain; 11hen it is also considered that there is
a heavy concentration of the American proc;ro.mme in regions of special American
interests (:i)articularly those areas in which heavy military aid is provided),
it becomes clear that it vould be feasible for Canada to maintain a proc;ramme
in selected regions of the developinc; 110rlc1 of financial rnac;nitudes similar
to those of the existing major donors.
J/Ioreover, Canada has rnore potential for a flexible proc;rarnrne than govern
ments Hho have maintained major proc;rammes over the lone; period.
are hamstrung by existing and onc;oins political obligations.
receivers are bound by the past.

The British

Givers as well as

Britain finds that with a proc;rarnme stagnant

in total size there is very .little flexibility to stril:e out in neu directions,
even if there is a desire to do so.

The lad: of traditional commit-

ments, or strongly defined exist.inc; interests, makes it uossible to conceive of
a Canadian aid policy Hith more flexibili tJ and :,1ore attention to the needs of
the developing world than would be e;~pected of 1aany other major donors.
If Canada were uillinc;, it coulc.1c have o.n iupact beyond the irnrn.ecliate
effect of the transfers involved.

If; for e;~auple, Canada stood ready to increase

the level of her commitment in cases where the recipient·country had fallen
foul of other donors:; this would strenc;then the barc;aininc; position of the poorer
countries in their dealings uith the other rich countries.

The fact that Canada

-was, for example, able to fill part of the c;ap follo11ing the dis1aantlinc; of the
Uest German assistance proc;ra.r,1ri1e to Tanzania minimized the costs to Tanzania of
pursuinc; an independent political policy.

Had this alternative not been open

to Tanzania, the:ce uoulc1 be a depressinc; effect on other African countries con
templatinc; effo:rts to assert their political independence.
Such a role uill not be easy_, especially ,!here major conflicts ,-rith entrenched
economic interests are involved o 1\s this paper is beine; written, the ConGoKinshasa c;overm1ent is enc;ac;ccl in direct confrontation ,'Tith Union Miniere over
the control of the Conc;olese copper industry.

The record of the Union Uiniere

in the Congo has been a sorry one of subversion and intrigueo

In lic;ht of recent

and past Congolese history, a Congolese c;overn1;1ent of any repute Hould Hish to
assume control over the decisions o.nc.1 c;ain access to the property of the Union
Ihniere.

Their ability to clo so effectively; however, ,1ill depend not only on

the ability of the im1ic;enous c;overnuent to uitl1stand incursions of foreign
elements into their politicrJ but .rill also require them to maintain the operation
1

of the industry in the event of the ,-rithdro.,ml of Belc;ian technical personnel
and an internationally orc;anizeci_ attempt to prevent access of Conc;olese copper
to world ma::cl:ets

O

Unfortunately, one suspects that the Belc;im1 c;overnrnent and

Union Miniere would be more effective in controllinc; the sale

of Conc;olese

exports than the British c;overnrnent has been in restraining Rhodesian exports.
In a case such as this, if it cornes to eventual confrontation, it seems
unlikely that Canada -would pursue policies openly at variance uith those of
the rest of the "Free Tlorld"o

Indeed; one sees no specio.1 reason to suppose

that Canadians ,muld have any desire to do so.

The point is that it is Canada's

oun choice, not her limited resources, which restrain her independence.
Canada uill only provide alterno.tivec 1·rhen the confrontation between poor
and rich does not irnpince on those :;.nterests ;-rhich the rich share and cleo.rly
1

reco(Ylize.
Houever, short of cuch confrontations, Co.no.do. can also have an effect by

distributinc lThatever effort she deci<lcs to naLc o.ccorc~inc; to criteria g_uite
different from those of other donors.

One ::;et of such criteria could be, for

example, based upon the o.tterJj_)t to identify the countries r:1ore liLely to achieve
the naximun development impact.

Such criteria Hould have the virtue, in the

Canadian context . of cm appearance of neutrality.

It is doubtful, of course,

uhether a si1,1ple set of such criteria could be defined.; there are also, for
e:rnnple, simple redistributive objectives 1rhich micht also seeE1 desiro.ble
(e.g., famine relief-type motivation).
Provision of o.id to those lil::ely to uake most effective use of it uoulc.1
provide for po.tte1°ns of fino.nce quite cUffercnt frOi:1 those of other Llaj or donors.
Hm-r far would it be 1,ossible for Canada in practice to gursue such a rac1ically
neutral course?
A little thouc;ht uould :i.nc1icate soi;1e cj_fficulties.

Could Canada envisace

the possibili t~r of provic1inc; ai6. proc:;raEJY,1es to lforth Korea, or Horth Vietno.rn,
for e::o.nple?

This is too e:~treue :C'or ~.1ost Canadians

but the dramatic diplomatic

achievements of France suc;c:;est tlmt inC:tcpern:1ent courses of action are possible.
Possibl~r, houever, the course 1.1hich could uost easily be folloued, is for
Canada to move in Gicnificantly different directions from Al.nerican-Anc;lo policy,
1·1hile avoic1inc; overt challenc;e"

11hen a developinc country bec;ins to pursue

policies render inc; it someuho.t suspect in terr;is of foreic:;n policies of the "Free
1/orld 11 , but has not ;,ret been promoted to the list of public enemies;, it i:1ight
be possible for Canada to e::tenc1 support uithout a.ppearinc; too obviously outrageous.
If Canada uere ,lillinG to ado~'.lt such

2.

role, coulcl it not be aro;ued that her

own proc:;rar.JL1es Houlcl contain the setlile Geec..1s of denoralization ·which were identified
above as the key danr,;er o:f:' c:;:istin,::; )ro,3raLrr,1es?
of reasons.

This i:s unlil:ely, for a nmi1ber

If Canaclo. souc)rt out those cow.1tries 11ho smelt rather bad in the
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noses of the other Free ".-Jorld c;overnments, the chances are that the governments
concerned uoulc1 be precisely those Hho are assertinc; national autonomy and are
least susceptible to cultural demoralization.

Secondly, Canada ·will al1rays enter

the scene as an influence slic;htly different fror,1 the previous external influence.
U.S. involvement in Africa, for e;:ample, often has the beneficial effect in under
mininc; the mystique and cultural influence of the previous colonial power,
merely because alternatives are offered, in relation to education for exrunple,
which implicitly challenge the assumptions of existing institutions.

To some

degree Canadian influence uoulcl not present the danc;er of bolste1·in13 inherited
colonial institutions.
Also, Canada has all the blandness of a prosperous but minor power.
Along with S,·ritzerlanc1 and Scandinavia, Canada share the characteristics of
substantial success in achievinG economic ·well-being along with the absence
of Imperial aobition, neither as a conter.1.)..Jorary career, nor as an historical
inheritance, nor even as a dream of things to come.

One has only to talk of

a Canadian, or a Swiss empire to realize how ludicrous the idea is.

It is

the fate of such countries to produce neither revolutions nor empires--but
as Switzerland has shown, it is possible for ther.1 to becoue havens both for
fugitive funds and. refut;ee politicians.

It is possible for them to consider

revolutions with eqmmimity--the y are neither lil8..y to be imported nor do they
challenge any ambition.

It is reasonable to suppo-se that Canada could mount

an aid progro.mme less attach<;d to a. set of ideological values than those nations
responsible for the 1wrlc.1' s future.

Therein lies the irnvortance of unimportance.

However skillfully Canada uses her aid proc;rarnne there is an upper limit
on the effect that can be obtained frorn this instrtunent.

He

l;Jay

through clever

planninc; increase the leverage of our aid, but the pressure ue can e~::ert is still
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limited by the fact that it is unlikely that we uill spend r.mch more than l~~ of
G.N.P., if that.

If ,Te uant to play a more iL1portant role; ue must find less

costly devices.

International trade is one such instr1m1ent, since it has the

advantac;e of benefitine; both tradinc; partners.

1;n iDaGinative trade policy Hill

enable us to help others o.c ,·rell as ourselves and ,-Ii thout straininc; charitable
instincts.
There can be little c:oubt that there is much roori1 for improvement in the
efficiency with Hhich we trade 11ith the third world; the obstacle iG that it would
require us to thinl~ the unthinb:tble; to consider policies uhich every layman lmows
to be .-Jronc; but every economist l:nous to be right.
1

If, for example, -we decided

to import certain lilanufactured c;oods from tmclerdeveloped countries, they uould
gain because of the increased mar Let, uhi1e we ,wuld gain f1~om lower costs.

In

other words, throuc;h trade ,·re can use the production facilities of other countries
to supplement our mm.

At the so.ue tide, they can use our specific resources to

supplement their::;.
He would have to pay for these increased inports through increased exports
and there's the rub.

lle have been so used to thinkinc; in terms of export pessimism

that this problem seems to be an overuhellilinc; one.

A little care ,rould shou that

it is not.
First and most important, there is a severe shortage of food loor.1inc; on the
horizon.

Canada could probably increase production of fooclstuffs at constant

prices much more quickly than underdeveloped countries can.

The reason we will

have difficulty sellinc; as much as 11e can produce is that the tmderdeveloped
cotmtries "\Till have difficulty payin13 for it.

If ue bou[3ht 1aore manufactured

Goods, He could sell nore ac;riculturul productso

Clearly, there is a need for a

far more imaginative trade--creatinc; policy by Canada than has been the case to date.
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There is no need to restrict our thinkinc; to the export of foodstuffs.
'rhe underdeveloped countries have an insatiable denand for machinery of all
l:inc.1s.

If Canadian industry used its ingenuity, it could open up large r.mrkets

for sale to the third ,rorld; provided of course , ue ,,rere willinc; to buy from it
as well.
If these profitable possibilities for trade are not taken advantac.;e of, it
uill not be because they do not exist, but because Canada has not had enouGh
ir.iagination,
The first requirement would be a 1'lillinc;ness to imac;ine c;radual but radical
changes in our econo1;i.ic structure.
import these c;oods fron afar.

1Te would give up some of our industries and

He would therefore c;ain flexibility; c.Uversifyine;

our trade sources and increasing our independence by loosenin~ certain of our
present close ties.

Secondly 1 our comparative advantage uoulcl come to depend

more on our st.ills and technoloc;y than our natural resource base.

The skills

of our entrepreneurs and labour could be increased and our "capacity to transform"
enhanced.
If we decided on this course of action; ne,1 institutions for promotinc; trade
uould be needed.

Just lmrerinc; tariff and other barriers is not enou13h.

One of

the most important obstacles to increased trade is inadequate information on
marketing opportunities.

The present international distribution anc1 cor.rraercial

system is more suited to the inadequate patterns of trade of the past than to the
task of creatinG new possibilities for the future.

Construction of neu trade

channels requires c;overnrnent as ,•;rell as r>riva.te initiative and thouc;h it would
involve many difficulties, the payoff' uill be corTespondincly higlL
In the pre sent conte:::t, United .States a.ml Etll'O~'Je have not tat.en ac1vantac;e
of profitable neu opportunities, :;_:iartly because of their political oblic;ations,
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)O.rtly because tlie;:,r have a vested interest in the ezistinc; structure, and lmrtly
because they are trapped b~r their old ideas.

Co.no.c1a could use the opportunities

available not only to increase her own trade with the third vorld, but also to
increase trade beti:reen other rich countries and the third world.

Cano.da could

play an active role as an economic i;1iddleman in the international economy just
8.s she prides herself in playing a r.1ic1cUe role in the political systen.

Although

a small pouer, Canada can act as a broker bet1veen more powerful interests.
Not only could Canada trade more, she might think in term8 of investine;
nore abroad.

Canadians are Do used to thinkinc; of themselves as a capital-scarce

country and a recipient of foreicn investment that they ha.ve not considered the
possibility of reversinG the role.
Canada, relative to the uorlcl as a 11hole, is richly endowed uitll capital,
technoloc;y, and entrepreneurship.

Her long experience uith foreic;n investors

could be used to devise ne-11 forms, more beneficial to the recipient country
than those available at present.
international corporation.

Canada could perhaps create a neu t;:,rpe of

J.iost firL1s at lJresent are not international but, in

:i-:--act, have their center of gravity in a particular developed corn1try.

Their

mo.rl:.etinc; concepts, personnel policies, and technoloesy are developed in the
conditions of the advanced countries and are often ill-suited to more bacbmrd
countries.

These corporations have limited horizons and do not understand the

production problems and factor availability in the underdeveloped. 11orld.

They

are very larce, feu in number) and have c:;reat barGaininc pouer vis-a-vis the veak
,zovernments of the underdeveloped worlds.

As pTofit maximizinG institutions; they

use this power fully, often bacLecl up by the political strene;th of their country"
As an example of Hhat Canada could do; consider the effect of the Italian Oil
Corapany, a

publicly owned corporation) ,Thich for a uhile challenged the

-22-

oligopoli stic position of the existinc; oil firms.

It offered bette1· terms, new

fo::-i;1s of orc;anizat ion, and c;o.ve the underdeve loped country an enlarc;ecl set of
alternativ es fron uhich to choose.
As Dudley Seers Iloints out, sL10.ll countries facinc; bic; companies are in a
much stronger barc;ainin c; position 11hen there is c;e.nuine co1;rpetitio n. 12

If it were

1,oosible to create Canaclian firus ca1xi.ble of independe nt action in the international economy and willing to upset e:xistinc; structure s, Canadian business night
be able to play a creative role.

VI

Canada is small, rich and fits nicely into her niche.
and sensible; in aid as elseuhere .

Her policies are sober

One choice is to continue alon:::; establish ed

paths.
Hhat does it mean to have an independe nt foreic:n policy?

If

1-,e o.e;ree Hith the policies of the major powers J there is no reason to bahave
differentl ~r.

If 1-re clisacree, \Je have sone difficult clecisions to :mo.l:e.

There is a small bird Hhich feeds by pickin,'.; food fror.1 betueen the teeth
of the hippopota uus; this bird is most expert in jude:inc; when hippopota rai close
their r:ioutlrn.

(Note:

applies to a crocodile .

One source claims that the story is apocrypha l o.nd any
No matter!)
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